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1.  Introduction 
Rather  frequently,  commercial  areas  locate  outside  the  cities.  When  consumers 
decide the store where to buy a given product, they then consider both the price and the 
transportation cost.  Stores must account for this aspect when  they  first decide their 
location along the commercial area and the price to be charged for the product. 
Although  normally  observed  in  practise,  surprisingly  the  literature  on  spatial 
competition has not considered the existence of restrictions with respect to the locations 
of firms and consumers in cities, in particular, their effects on the selected locations and 
prices.  One  exception  is  the  linear  model  of  vertical  differentiation  proposed  by 
Gabszewicz and Thisse (1986), which considers a uniform mass of consumers located 
along a linear city and two firms located outside one of the extremes of the city. It is 
well  known  that  a  first-location-then-price  equilibrium  does  exist  in  this  model, 
independently of transportation costs being convex or concave in distance.
1 
However, the vertical differentiation model is a rather hard simplification of real life 
situations. Quite often, we observe that commercial areas attract not only consumers of 
a  particular  neighbouring  city  or  suburb,  but  consumers  from  several  surrounding 
locations. 
An illustrative example is the usual case of two linear cities with a commercial area 
between the two.
2 However, this case has not been analyzed in the literature, which, 
starting with Hotelling (1929), studies the model of horizontal differentiation where no 
location restrictions apply. The existence of the sequential equilibrium in this model is 
questioned in the literature, although it is well known that such an equilibrium exists in 
the case where the transportation cost are quadratic in distance, see D’Aspremont et al. 
                                                
1 Gabszewicz and Thisse (1986) show the existence of equilibrium in the case where the transportation 
cost is linear-quadratic in distance, i.e., C(d) = ad + bd
2, a ≥ 0, b ≥ 0, where d is the distance between the 
consumer and the firm. Very recently, Arguedas et al. (2005) have confirmed this existence result under 
the concave specification C(d) =ad-bd
2, a ≥ 0, b ≥ 0. 
 
2 This would correspond to consider two overlapped models of vertical differentiation. 
   3 
(1979).
3  A  common  result  in  the  literature  is  that,  under  existence,  the  sequential 
equilibrium involves maximal differentiation. 
But location restrictions may also apply to circular cities, a case which has not been 
analyzed in the literature either. Till now, conclusions with respect to the circle model 
with no location restrictions summarize in the existence of the sequential equilibrium at 
least in the quadratic case and under certain concave and convex specifications of the 
transportation costs, see Anderson (1986) or De Frutos et al. (1999, 2002). 
In this paper, we analyze whether the sequential equilibrium would persist under the 
mentioned  restrictions  on  the  locations  of  firms  and  consumers.  In  particular,  we 
analyze  the  case  of  quadratic  transportation  costs,  which,  as  explained  above,  is 
unquestioned in both the linear and the circular models. 
Our results are rather negative. We find that there exists no sequential equilibrium in 
any model (linear or circular) when there is a separation between the residential and the 
commercial areas. 
In  the  linear  model,  we  find  that  there  exist  no  locations  of  the  firms  in  the 
commercial area for which Nash price equilibrium exists, other than locating exactly in 
the same place and charging a zero price (the Bertrand solution). The result is quite 
surprising, since intuition would suggest that firms would be tempted to differentiate as 
much as possible within the commercial area to avoid competition. However, if firms 
differentiated, stability in prices would not be possible. Given the discontinuity of the 
region were consumers live, firms would be tempted to either increase prices when the 
consumers of their own hinterland strictly prefer their products to the ones of their 
competitors or decrease prices when their natural consumers start thinking of travelling 
to the other firm to save total costs. 
In the circle model, results are not that harsh. As before, there exists no Nash price 
equilibrium for all the possible locations of the firms in the commercial area. However, 
                                                
3 However, under the linear-quadratic specification of Gabszewicz and  Thisse (1986) and  symmetric 
locations, the sequential equilibrium does not exist, a result which is after extended by Anderson (1988) 
to the case of asymmetric locations, and to functions of the type C￿(d) = d 
n, 1 ≤ n ≤ 1.26, by Economides 
(1986).  Arguedas  et  al.  (2005)  confirm  the  inexistence  of  the  sequential  equilibrium  under  concave 
transportation costs.   4 
at least we find a region where such price equilibrium exists, which is positively related 
to the length of the commercial area. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the 
model. In Section 3, we analyze the equilibrium existence under location restrictions in 
the linear model. In Section 4, we study the circular model. We conclude in Section 5. 
All the proofs are in the Appendix. 
 
2.  The model 
We consider the two traditional models of spatial competition with a slight variation 
with respect to the allowed locations of both consumers and firms in the market. 
Our  linear  model  is  a  market  of  length  1  composed  of  two  parts  (Figure  1):  a 
commercial area of length 0 ≤ v≤ 1 where firms locate, and a residential area of  length 
1 – v  where consumers live. For convenience, we assume that the commercial area is 
centrally situated between locations ½ - v/2 and  ½ + v/2. This area is occupied by two 
firms  
 
Figure 1: The linear model  
 
 
which sell a homogeneous commodity with zero production costs. We denote by xi  the 
location of firm i in this area, such that  ½ - v/2 ≤ x1 ≤ x2 ≤ ½ + v/2. Let z denote the 
distance between the two firms, i.e., z = x2 – x1. Also let q be the sum of the two firms 
locations,  q  =  x1  +  x2.  Given  firms’  locations,  q/2  represents  the  equidistant  point 
between the two firms and constitutes a useful symmetry measure, as we will see later 
on. For given locations, firm i chooses the mill price which maximizes profits, i.e., the 
price times the number of units sold.   5 
Consumers  uniformly  locate  along  the  residential  area.  Let  denote  the  consumer 
location in this area as  x ∈[0, ½ - v/2] ∪ [0, ½ - v/2]. Each consumer buys only one unit 
of  the  goods  at  the  firm  with  the  lowest  total  cost,  that  is,  the  mill  price  plus  the 
transportation cost.
4  The distance between the consumer and firm i is defined by di =|x 
- xi|, i = 1,2. We assume that transportation costs are quadratic, as follows: 
C(di) = di
2                                                             (1) 
As  noted  in  the  introduction,  this  model  integrates  two  cases  of  vertical 
differentiation: in the first one, consumers locate in  [0, ½ - v/2] and firms locate in  [ ½ 
- v/2 , ½ + v/2] ; in the second one, firms locate in the same region  [ ½ -v/2 , ½ + v/2] 
and consumers live in  [ ½ + v/2 , 1 ]. 
For instance, this situation may reflect the case where two cities share a commercial 
area located between the two.
5 
Alternatively, our circular model consists of a market of perimeter 1 composed of a 
commercial area of length 0 ≤ v ≤ ½  and a residential area of length 1 - v  (Figure 2). 
Now, the locations of the two firms satisfy that 0 ≤ x1 ≤ x2 ≤ v  and the location of a 
typical consumer in the residential area satisfies  x ∈[1 – v ]. The remaining ingredients 
are exactly the same as those of the linear model described above. 
                                                
4 For simplicity, we assume that all consumers have enough willingness to pay. This assumption is 
common in all the literature on spatial differentiation. 
 
5 Alternatively, this model refers to the case where, for equal prices, a clearly identified subset of 
consumers prefer the product of firm 1 while the remaining consumers prefer the product of firm 2.   6 
 
Figure 2: The circular model 
The  location  of  the  indifferent  consumer  in  any  of  the  two  described  models  is 
determined as follows: 
p1 + C (d1) = p2 +C (d2)                                               (2) 
We  consider  a  sequential  game  where  firms  first  decide  their  locations  in  the 
commercial area and then, they choose prices which maximize profits given the selected 
locations. We concentrate on the concept of sub-game perfect equilibrium. Thus, we 
solve backwards, first finding the Nash equilibrium prices for given locations. 
In the next section, we analyze the existence of the sequential equilibrium in the 
linear model of spatial competition. 
 
3.  Equilibrium existence in the linear model   7 
Consider the linear model as described in the previous section (Figure 1). We first 
derive firms’ demands and then we analyze the existence of the sequential equilibrium. 
3.1.  Demand functions 
To  obtain  the  demand  functions,  we  first  obtain  the  location  of  the  indifferent 
consumer, described by (2). Considering (1) and  di = |x-xi|,  i = 1,2, the expression of 
the indifferent consumer is the following: 
 
By the construction of the model, all consumers located to the left of X select firm 1, 
while the remaining consumers choose firm 2. Therefore, depending on the location of 
the indifferent consumer on the line, the demand of firm 1 is the following:
6 
 
The first part of (4) refers to the case where  X ≥ 1 and, consequently, firm 1 attracts 
all the demand. In part 2, X belongs to the interval [½+v/2, 1]. In part 3, there exists a 
fictitious indifferent consumer situated in the commercial area [½ - v/2, ½ + v/2] and, 
consequently, each firm attracts its own hinterland only. Part 4 refers to the case where 
the indifferent consumer lives in the region [0, ½ - v/2]. Finally, part 5 reflects the case 
where  X ≤ 0  and consequently, no consumer buys at firm 1. 
Since there are no production costs, the benefit functions are Bi = pi Di  for all i. 
Given (3), (4) and the fact that D2 = 1 – v – D1, the corresponding expressions for the 
firms’ benefit functions are as follows: 
                                                
6 The demand of firm 2 is simply D2 = 1 - v – D1 
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3.2.  Equilibrium existence 
We now analyze the existence of a Nash-price equilibrium for given locations. Given 
(x1, x2), a Nash-price equilibrium is a pair (p1
*, p2
* ) such that each firm selects the price 
which maximizes profits, considering the other firm’s equilibrium price as given. That 
is, (p1
*, p2
* ) satisfies the following: 
Bi(pi
*, pj
* ) ≥ Bi (pi, pj
* ), for all i and  j, i ≠  j 
It is well known that Nash price equilibrium exists under quadratic transportation 
costs  when  there  are  no  restrictions  on  firms  and  consumers’  locations,  see 
D’Aspremont et al. (1979). However, we now show that the equilibrium fails to exist 
under those restrictions, i.e., when v ≥ 0. The result is now summarized in the following: 
Proposition 1. Given v ≥ 0, the only possible Nash-price equilibrium in the linear 
model implies that p1
* = p2
* = 0  and  z = 0. 
This result is quite surprising. In fact, one would expect prices’ equilibria to exist if 
firms differentiated as much as they can to obtain maximum profits. Also, given the 
symmetry of the problem, one would also expect these prices to be equal. In fact, this is 
what  the  literature  on  spatial  differentiation  predicts,  at  least  when  there  are  no   9 
restrictions  on  firms  and  consumers’  locations.  However,  when  these  location 
restrictions apply, we find that there exist no possible firms’ locations for which such a 
price equilibrium exists other than the minimum differentiation result, which yields to 
Bertrand’s solution. 
The explanation of this result is the following. Assume that, initially, the two firms 
charge the same price (including zero as a possibility) and each one locates at one 
extreme  of  the  commercial  area.  Then,  each  firm  attracts  consumers  of  its  own 
hinterland only.  The  reason is  that there exists a separation between the firms and, 
therefore, there is a transportation cost associated with travelling from one firm to the 
other. Knowing this, one of the firms may decide to increase the price to increase its 
revenues, at least till consumers of its own hinterland are indifferent between this and 
the other firm. But then, the other firm may decide to decrease its price to start attracting 
consumers of the other hinterland. And the first firm may decrease its price as well to 
try  to  recover  some  of  the  lost  consumers.  Etc.  In  summary,  no  possible  price 
equilibrium exists when firms differentiate as much as they can. Moreover, the same 
type of argument can be applied when there is some differentiation between the firms, 
not  necessarily  maximum.  As  a  consequence,  the  only  possible  equilibrium  is  no 
separation between firms and competition a la Bertrand. 
 
4.   Equilibrium existence in the circular model 
In  this  section,  we  analyze  the  equilibrium  existence  in  the  circular  model.  We 
present the results in the same way as those of the previous section, first determining the 
demand functions and then analyzing the existence of the sequential equilibrium. 
4.1.  Demand functions 
To obtain the demand functions, we first calculate the location of the indifferent 
consumer(s) in the circle. Remember that the indifferent consumer satisfies (2). To do 
this, we first distinguish three regions in the area where consumers live, depending on 
the way they take to travel to the firms. These are regions A, B and C (Figure 2). 
Locations of consumers in these areas satisfy   xA ∈ [v, x1+½], xB ∈ [x1+½, x2+½ ], and   10 
xC ∈ [x2+½, 1], respectively. Thus, all consumers in region A travel clockwise whereas 
all consumers in C travel counter clockwise, independently of the selected firm. In the 
case of region B, only consumers who choose firm 2 travel clockwise. 
We first concentrate on region A to obtain the location of the indifferent consumer X. 
Considering (1) and (2), XA satisfies the following: 
p1 + (XA – x1)
2 = p2 + (XA – x2)
2, 
since any consumer in region A travels clockwise. Thus, the location of the indifferent 
consumer in this region is:  
 
Since XA ∈ [v, x1+½] , it is easy to see that there exists an indifferent consumer in 
region A characterized by (5) if and only if z (2v - q) ≤ p2 – p1 ≤ z (1 - z). Since, by 
definition, v ≥ q/2 , a necessary condition for  XA to exist is clearly  p2 ≥ p1. Else, all 
consumers in region A would prefer firm 2, since it is the nearest firm. Given region A 
and XA, all consumers to the right of XA travel clockwise to firm 1, and all consumers to 
the left of XA travel clockwise to firm 2. 
In  region  B,  consumers  selecting  firm  2  travel  clockwise  while  the  remaining 
consumers travel counter clockwise. Therefore, the location of the indifferent consumer 
in this region, XB,  satisfies the following: 
p1 + [(1 – XB ) + x1]
2 = p2 + (XB – x2)
2 
Operating in this expression, we obtain: 
 
Since XB ∈ [x1+½, x2+½], there exists an indifferent consumer in region B if and 
only if  -z (1 - z) ≤ p2 – p1 ≤ z (1 - z). Here, it is interesting to see that both p1 ≥ p1 and p1 
≤ p2 are valid for XB to exist. In fact, in the particular case where p1 = p2, the indifferent 
consumer is located exactly opposite to the equidistant point between the firms, q/2.   11 
Thus,  consumers  to  the  right  of  XB  select  firm  2  travelling  clockwise,  whereas 
consumers to the left of XB choose firm 1 travelling counter clockwise. 
Finally, all consumers in region C travel counter clockwise. Therefore, the location 
of the indifferent consumer in this region, XC satisfies the following: 
p1 + [(1 – XC) + x1)
2 = p2 + [(1 – XC) + x2]
2 , 
from which we obtain: 
 
Since XC ∈ [x2+½, 1], we can conclude that there exists an indifferent consumer in 
region C if and only if  - z (1 - z) ≤ p2 – p1 ≤ - zq. In this case, a necessary condition for 
XC to exist is p2 ≤ p1. Else, all consumers in region C would select firm 1, their nearest 
firm. Thus, given region C and XC, all consumers in [x2+½, XC] travel counter clockwise 
to firm 1 while the remaining consumers travel counter clockwise to firm 2. 
Next, a relevant question to derive the demand functions is to determine the number 
of indifferent consumers along the residential area. This crucially depends on the prices 
difference, p2 - p1. By our assumptions, we have - z (1-z) < - zq < z (2v-q) < z (1-z). 
Therefore, considering all the previous analysis, there exist two indifferent consumers 
when - z (1-z) <  p2 – p1 < - zq, those given by expressions (6) and (7). Also, there exist 
two indifferent consumers when z (2v-q) < p2 – p1 < z (1-z), those given by expressions 
(5) and (6). However, there is only one indifferent consumer given by (6) when - zq < 
p2 – p1 < z (2v-q). In the remaining cases, only one firm attracts all the demand. 
Consequently, the demand function of firm 1 can be expressed as follows:
7 
                                                
7 The corresponding demand of firm 2 is simply D2 = 1- v – D1    12 
 
Firms’ profits are Bi = Dipi, since production costs are zero. Therefore, considering 
(5), (6), (7), (8) and D2 = 1 - v – D1  we have: 
 
In the next subsection, we analyze the existence of the sequential equilibrium in the 
circular model. 
4.2.  Equilibrium existence 
For given locations, a Nash-price equilibrium is a pair (p1
*, p2
* ) such that each firm 
selects the price which maximizes profits, considering the other firm’s equilibrium price 
as given. That is, (p1
*, p2
* ) satisfies: 
Bi(pi
*, pj
* ) ≥ Bi (pi, pj
* ), for all i and  j, i ≠  j                             (9)   13 
We now characterize the equilibrium in the following proposition. The result also 
shows that such equilibrium does not necessarily exist for all the possible locations of 
the firms.
8 
Proposition 2. Given v ≥ 0, the Nash-price equilibrium in the circular model is the 
following: 
p1* = (1/3)(1 – z)(3 – q – v)    p2* = (1/3)(1 – z)(3 + q – 4v)   (10) 
Such equilibrium exists if and only if (v, q, z) ∈ A  
In contrast with the linear model, we have now determined location regions where a 
Nash price equilibrium can exist. This region is clearly dependent on the length of the 
commercial area. In Figure 3, we illustrate that the equilibrium region increases with v 
(we analyze the particular cases where v = 1/4, v =1/3, and v = 1/2). In the horizontal 
axis we measure z, the distance between the firms, and in the vertical axis we measure 
q, the double of the centrality within the commercial area. The valid region A is shown 
shadowed. 
 
Figure 3: Equilibrium regions for v=1/4, v=1/3 and v=1/2. 
                                                
8 The set A in the proposition is properly defined in the Appendix.   14 
 
5.  Concluding comments 
In  this  paper,  we  have shown  that,  under  location  restrictions  of  both firms  and 
consumers,  the  sequential  equilibrium  may  fail  to  exist.  This  result  is  particularly 
important  since  we  have  considered  the  case  of  quadratic  transportation  costs,  an 
assumption which undoubtedly leads to existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium in 
the two traditional linear and circular models of spatial competition. 
We have found that, while there is an equilibrium region in the circular model for 
which  a  Nash  price  equilibrium  may  exist,  however  there  are  no  feasible  firms’ 
locations in the linear model for which we can obtain such equilibrium. In other words, 
while it is still possible to explain some degree of differentiation in the circular model 
under location restrictions, however this is not possible under linear specifications. 
It is interesting to note that we have imposed two types of restrictions in firms and 
consumers’  locations.  First,  we  have  established  an  area  where  firms  must  locate. 
Second, we have prevented consumers from locating in that area. This second restriction 
is the one which breaks the sequential equilibrium down in both models. In fact, it is 
rather simple to prove that equilibrium exists under firms’ location restrictions but no 
consumers’ location restrictions. 
 
6.  Appendix 
Proof  of  Proposition  1.  We  first  analyze  whether  there  exists  a  Nash-price 
equilibrium in the region R2 = {(p1, p2) / p1 – p2 ∈ [- z (2 – q), z (q – 1 - v]}. If 
equilibrium were to exist in this region, it would be the following: 
p1* = (1/3) z (2 + q – 4v)       p2* = (1/3) z (4 - q – 2v)    (11) 
and the corresponding profits would be 
B1(p1*, p2*) = (1/18) z (2 + q – 4v)
2  B2(p1*, p2*)=(1/18) z (4 - q – 2v)
 2   15 
Considering (11), we have  p1*- p2* = (2/3) z (q-1-v). We now have to verify that 
(p1*, p2*) ∈ R2. It is clear that –z (2-q) < p1*- p2*, since, by our assumptions, q < 2(2-v). 
However, p1*- p2* ≤ z (q-1-v) would require  q ≥ 1 + v, which, by our assumptions 
holds only when q = 1 + v. Therefore, this would mean that  p1* =  p2* + z (q-1-v), and 
consequently, the indifferent consumer would be located at  v + ½. 
Using the same argument, we can also conclude that there exists no equilibrium in 
the region R4 = {(p1, p2) / p1 – p2 ∈ [ z ( q -.1 + v), z q]} 
Finally, in region R3 = {(p1, p2) / p1 – p2 ∈ [ z (q – 1 – v), z (q – 1 + v)]}, there exists 
no equilibrium either. If it were to exist, it would be such that: 
p1* = p2 + z (q - 1 + v)       p2* = p1 + z (q - 1 – v), 
since  firms’  profits  are  increasing  with  p1  in  region  R3.  However,  there  exists  a 
contradiction between p1* and p2*, since v > 0. 
Therefore, there exists no Nash price equilibrium in this model, except when v = 0. 
This  also  implies  z  =  0  and  consequently,  p1*  =  p2*  =  0,  which  corresponds  to 
Bertrand’s solution. 
Proof of Proposition 2. For given locations, if a Nash price equilibrium were to 
exist,  it  would  be  such  that      p1  –  p2  ∈  [-  z  (2v  –  q),  z  q].  Considering  (9),  the 
expressions  for  the  equilibrium  prices  and  the  corresponding  firms’  profits  at  the 
equilibrium are: 
p1* = (1/3)(1 – z )(3 - q – 2v)     p2* = (1/3)(1 – z )(3 + q – 4v)    (12) 
B1(p1*, p2*) = (1/18) (1 – z )(3 - q – 2v)
2      B2(p1*, p2*)=(1/18) )(1 – z )(3 + q – 4v)
2 
To  guarantee  that  (12)  is  a  Nash equilibrium,  we  need to  ensure that  the  prices 
differences belong to the appropriate range and that each price is a best response for 
each firm given the other firm’s price. That is: 
(i)   p1 – p2 ∈ [ z ( q -.1 + v), z q] 
(ii)  B1(p1
*, p2
* ) ≥ B1 (p1, p2
* ), for all   p1 ≥ 0   16 
(iii) B2(p1
*, p2
* ) ≥ B2 (p1
*, p2
 ), for all   p2 ≥ 0 
Considering (12), we obtain that condition (i) is satisfied if and only if: 
 
To ensure (ii), we fix p2
* and first analyze firm 1’s best response in the region 
R32 = {p1 / p1 – p2*∈ [- z (1 – z), - z (2v - q)]}. Define: 
 
First, we guarantee that  p1** ∈ R32 , which is true if and only if: 
 
Now,  we  ensure  that    B1(p1
*,  p2
*  )  ≥  B1  (p1
**,  p2
*  )  by  means  of  the  following 
condition: 
4z (3 – q – 2v)
2 – [3z (1 – 2v) + (3 + q – 4v)]
 2 ≥ 0     (18) 
If (16) is not satisfied, then p1
** ≤ p2
* - z (1 - z). Therefore, B1 (p1
*, p2
* ) ≥ B1 (p2
*- 
z(1-z), p2
* ) if and only if: 
 q
2 + 2q (5v – 6) + [-20v
2 + 6v (5 – 3z) – 9 (1 – 2z)]  ≥ 0    (19) 
If (17) is not satisfied, we then have p1
** ≤  p2
* - z (2v - q). In this case, we have 
B1(p1
*, p2
* ) ≥ B1 (p1, p2
* ) for all p1 ∈ R32.
  
We now study firm1’s best response within R34  = {p1 / p1 – p2* ∈ [zq,  z (1 – z)]}. 
We define:   17 
 




* ) ≥ B1(p1***, p2
* ) is equivalent to having: 
4 z (3 – q - 2v)
2 – [3 z + (3 + q - 4v)]
2 ≥ 0      (22) 
If (21) is not satisfied, then B1(p1
*, p2
* ) ≥ B1 (p1, p2*
 ) for all p1 ∈ R34. 
 Summarizing,  condition  (ii)  is  satisfied  if  and  only  if  the  following  restrictions 
apply: 
- If (16) and (17) hold, then (18) must hold. 
- If (16) does not hold, then (19) must hold. 
- If (21) holds, then (22) must hold. 
We now study the conditions under which (iii) is satisfied. We fix p1
* given by (12) 
and we analyze firm 2’s best response in the region R’32 = { p2 / p1* – p2 ∈ [- z (1 – z), - 
z (2v - q)]} 
We define 
 




* ) ≥ B1(p1*, p2*** ) is satisfied if and only if    18 
 4 z (4v – q - 3)
2 – [3 z + (3 - q - 4v)]
2 ≥ 0     (24) 
If (23) is not satisfied, we then have p1* -  p2*** ≥
 - z (2v - q). In this case, we have 
B2(p1
*, p2
* ) ≥ B1 (p1*, p2
 ) for all p2 ∈ R’32. 
Now, we study firm 2’s best response in R’34  = {p2 / p1* – p2 ∈ [zq,  z (1 – z)]}. We 
define: 
 




* ) ≥ B1 (p1*, p2**
 ) if and only if 
4 z (4v – q - 3) – [3 z (1 - 2v) + (3 - 2v - q)]
2 ≥ 0     (27) 
If (25) is not satisfied, it’s easy to see that B2(p1
*, p2
* ) ≥ B1 (p1*, p2
 ) for all p2 ∈ R’34. 
If (26) is not satisfied, then we have to ensure B2(p1
*, p2
* ) ≥ B1 (p1*, p1*- z(1 – z)), 
this expression is equivalent to 
 (3 + q - 4v)
2 –6 (1 - v) [(3 - 2v - q) – 3z]
2 ≥ 0       (28) 
Summarizing, condition (iii) holds if and only if the following restrictions apply: 
- If (23) holds, then (24) must hold. 
- If (25) and (26) hold, then (27) must hold. 
- If (26) does not hold, then (28) must hold. 
The set A is composed by all the requirements needed for conditions (i), (ii) and (iii) 
to subsist. Thus, a price equilibrium exists if and only if (v, q, z) ∈ A.    19 
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